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INTERGROUP CONFLICT REDUCTION THROUGH 
IDENTITY AFFIRMATION: OVERCOMING THE IMAGE 
OF THE ETHNIC OR ENEMY “OTHER” 
      
Thomas Boudreau 
Abstract 
 This paper first argues that a conflict between groups can be lessened by the explicit 
affirmation by one group of the other group’s identity, including its past pain, defeats and 
collective losses, when appropriate. A model of group affirmation is then proposed, consisting 
of: Leadership, Recognition, Validation and the Transparency of Future Time.  The groups 
involved can be ethnic or national in scope. This model is defined in terms of another possible 
ARIA model to be added to the one already proposed, though quite different in content, by Jay 
Rothman (1997). Limitations concerning the use of this model are discussed as well. 
 
In this Age of Ambiguity, individuals and groups often look for a reassuring refuge in a 
unique and historical group identity. As William Graham Sumner (2001) observes, such group 
identity both includes and excludes--the ingroup/outgroup phenomenon--which insures self-
contained or self-imposed psychocultural and social borders. Georg Simmel argues that such 
borders or boundaries seem necessary to provide a sense of inclusion within the group which, in 
turn, provides the individual with a sense of belonging and purpose (Simmel 1964). Following 
Simmel’s lead, Lewis Coser argues that, in times of uncertainty or perceived threat to the in-
group, the group's boundaries become less permeable, and more rigid (Coser 1956). This 
dynamic may, in part, explain the growing importance, and clash, of ethnic identities in modern 
times, especially in areas of the world, such as Eastern Europe or the Middle East, that are 
experiencing profound uncertainty, violence and change. 
 From the perspective of realistic group conflict theory, groups compete with each other 
for land, scarce resources and relative, if not absolute, security.  Influenced by Simmel and 
Coser, Levine, and Campbell (1972) state that, from the perspective of the theory, the presence 
of a perceived threat from the outside consolidates the group’s’ boundaries, solidifies group 
membership and heightens the costs of a member’s defection. They point out that groups under 
threat, or with a besieged mentality, often develop a hardened self-image, or so it seems so to 
outside observers. The resulting image of the group under threat is often one of rigid, almost 
fossilized, formation with little or no diversity of discourses among elites, or the membership at 
large, nor any variation in the perception of the hostile or “enemy” other. In many cases of 
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groups under threat, this image of a fixed and fossilized interior group-life is probably true, 
especially in dictatorships where the opportunities for dissenting points of view are almost nil 
even in the best of times.  
Yet, such a static conception of group identity, as presented in realistic group conflict 
theory, overlooks the dynamic and competitive processes of negotiating identities that can 
potentially operate between groups (Kelman 1997a,b). Expanding upon this idea, we focus on 
the selective definition of the group’s identity with an emphasis on its interior processes of 
dynamic self-definition. In doing so, we assume an alternative view of group life, even under a 
perceived threat, that is much more dynamic, and competitive than realistic group conflict 
theory presents concerning the dominant discourses among elites and members, which, in turn, 
allows for the selective redefinition of a group through affirmation by an outgroup.  
The main premise of this paper is that the tension and mistrust associated with past 
conflict between groups, or even between nations-states, can be lessened, and perhaps even 
healed, by the explicit affirmation of another group's identity, and especially the deliberate 
acknowledgement of each group's past pain, struggles and losses, which Vamik Volkan (1998) 
defines as its collective loss. This premise is, in turned, based upon two implicit and 
interrelated axioms, namely that: (1) Group identity is largely a social construction that 
involves a dynamic process of selective self definition. (2) The selective self definition of the 
group’s histories and psycho-cultural boundaries includes its history of traumatic experiences 
or, more precisely, the “traumatized self-representation” (Volkan 1998) of the group; it is 
within this process of group self-definition that one can fully understand and appreciate 
Volkan’s problematic terms: “chosen traumas” and “chosen glories.”  
 The deposited traumatized self representation of the group can be addressed and, over a 
period of time, partially healed by an explicit affirmation of the in-group’s identities, including 
its selective self-definition of the group’s triumphs and tragedies. The key is to view the act of 
identity affirmation as an attempt to influence a group’s own interior set of selective and 
privileged discourses among its elites and members concerning its view of itself as well as out-
groups that are potentially or actually a threatening enemy-other. These selective sets of 
interior dialogues and privileged discourses are occurring simultaneously in each potentially 
conflicting group. The goal of identity affirmation is to transform the potential or actual 
conflict by addressing and transforming over time each of these simultaneous, interior 
discourses. As we shall see, it may be the most difficult task of a leader to transform, not the 
image of the enemy other help by the out-group, but the image of the enemy other held by one 
own in-group. This problem as a possibility is not really addressed in realistic group conflict 
theory. 
In the following analysis, we will focus on group identities involved in ethnic or 
interstate conflict. There are important differences in these different groups, and in the 
appropriate levels of analysis required by each.  Even so, as Timothy Nieguth (1999) argues, 
there are similarities in the social structures that permit the shared though restricted analysis of 
both in terms of group identity and its formation and preservation. As Byrne and Carter (1996) 
point out, group identity often consist of the composite yet shared configuration of interrelated 
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factors that they characterize as social cubism; they argue that these factors are found in 
common across a variety of different ethnonational groups. This requires a multidimensional 
analysis of a conflict in order to reveal the complex interrelationships involved (Byrne and 
Carter, 1996). As we shall see, the processes and factors inherent in identity affirmation are 
multidimensional as well, and are applied to the identity groups’ that are either ethnic or 
national in scope in the following paper. 
 
       Conflict Transformation 
The idea of conflict reduction through identity affirmation builds upon the theoretical 
work of previous scholars, especially Charles Osgood (1962),  Chadwick Alger (1988), Raimo 
Vayrnen (1991), Janice Gross Stein (2001) and, as mentioned, Herb Kelman (1997a,b). For 
instance, Charles Osgood (1962) proposed the idea of the graduated reciprocation in tension 
reduction (GRIT) as one means of lessening hostility and mistrust between groups. The idea of 
GRIT is that one party announces in advance that it is taking a step or a series of steps 
designed to reduce tension via concrete, verifiable actions. Etzioni (1968) suggests that GRIT 
influenced President John F. Kennedy’s American University speech, in which he announced 
the unilateral ending of above ground nuclear testing by the United States and he invited the 
Soviet Union to do the same (Kennedy 1963). President Kennedy thus initiated a process that 
resulted in the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the beginnings of detente.   
While in some ways similar, the process of identity affirmation is different from GRIT 
since, in the latter, the focus is on specific initiatives or actions while in the former it is on the 
unique identity of the respective groups. For instance, as we’ll presently see, President John F. 
Kennedy, in his American University Speech (1963), also affirmed the identity of the Soviet 
peoples, and especially emphasized their suffering as a nation during World War II. 
The concept of identity affirmation grows directly out of the ongoing research on 
conflict transformation. For instance, Raimo Vayrenen (1991) identifies several ways in which 
conflict transformation takes place. His ideas complement those of Galtung (1984,1996) who 
emphasizes the analysis of inter-party and intra-party conflicts in their structural, cultural and 
behavioral contexts. According to Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999), one of the key 
ways of reducing conflict is through personal and group transformation. Citing Galtung and 
Vayrenen, they point out that “conflict transformation requires real change in parties’ interests, 
goals or self-definition. These may be forced or encouraged by the conflict itself, or may come 
about because of intra-party changes, shifts in the constituencies of the parties or changes in 
the context in which the conflict is situated” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999, 
p.158). In conflict reduction through identity affirmation, the purpose is transformation of the 
group’s interior processes of selective self-definition, which can, in turn, open up new 
possibilities for inter-group peace. 
In her article, “Image, Identity and The Resolution of Violent Conflict,” Janice Gross 
Stein proposes a process very similar to identity affirmation Stein states that in “both enduring 
interstate rivalries and bitter ethnic conflict, interests are shaped by images that in turn are 
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partially shaped by identity” (Stein, 2001, p.189). Like Kelman, she states that “the identities 
that shape images are not given but are socially reconstructed as interactions develop and 
contexts evolve over the trajectory of a conflict” (Stein, 2001, p.189). She especially 
emphasizes the importance of leadership in initiating a series of challenges and changes to the 
group’s self-image, and its image of the other group.  
Stein points out that once “leaders or groups begin to change their image of their 
adversary and are interested in attempting to resolve their conflict, they must also change the 
image their adversary has of them if conflict reduction is to make any progress” (Stein, 2001, p 
201).  Following and developing her argument, we will refine the role of leadership in the 
process of identity affirmation by specifying the critical and most dangerous moments for 
leaders when trying to change the in-group’s perception of the out-group. As we shall see from 
the historical record, leaders often try to first change the “image their adversary has of them” 
without first successfully transforming their group’s image of their adversary. As the tragic 
examples of Gandhi, Sadat and Rabin illustrate, the failure of transforming one’s own group 
perception of the other can be catastrophic for the leadership since their assassins came from 
within the leader’s own group. 
 
Conflict Reduction Through Identity Affirmation: 
     A Proposed Model 
A dynamic definition of a group’s selective self-definition provides for the distinct possibility 
of inter-group conflict reduction through identity affirmation that results in the incremental, or 
even dramatic, changes in the in-group’s internal discourses and perceptions of an out group or 
groups. In effect, one group is trying to negotiate or renegotiate its identity first within itself 
and secondly, with another group. Kelman points out concerning this secondary process that 
“how a group defines itself has significant consequences for others…its chosen identity has an 
impact on the interests, rights and identity of other groups. Such groups do, therefore, have a 
legitimate concern about and stake in the way in which a given group defines itself. For this 
reason, national identity, even though it is a psychological fact created by the way a group 
chooses to define itself, is a legitimate subject for negotiation with other groups …that are 
affected by this self-definition"  (Kelman, 1997b, p.337).  
In conflict reduction through identity affirmation, one group is trying to do one or all of 
the following four changes: (1) change or, in Kelman’s words, “negotiate” the in-group’s 
identity among its own elites and members, (2) challenge and attempt to negotiate the out-
group’s perception of one’s own group, (3) challenge and attempt to negotiate the perception 
of the out-group concerning its own collective identity and ethos, and (4) change or negotiate 
simultaneously new perceptions and understanding of one’s own group and its collective 
mythos concerning the ethnic or enemy image of another group—a truly transformative 
process, and hence a truly courageous step, as we shall see, for leaders or members to take. 
This is, in effect, trying to engage and partially heal one’s own group’s inner most hurts, fears 
and traumas and, by doing so, change its image of the out group or enemy other. As we shall 
see, this latter step is the most dangerous one for leaders to undertake. All of these steps 
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presuppose that a group’s identity is subject to competing and selective internal discourses 
concerning its collective mythos. 
So the question presents itself: How should such affirmations be carried out and 
completed? Obviously, there is no factual formula that can be universally applied to each and 
all situations, especially where inter-group or international conflicts are persistent and severe. 
In short, no set formula is exclusive--each unique situation calls for an identity affirmation 
process that is tailored to local circumstances and historical circumstances. It may not work in 
some situations at all.  
Given these limitations, it may be useful nevertheless to outline a tentative model for 
conflict reduction through identity affirmation to be tried and tested in actual and ongoing 
disputes. In outlining such a model, I shall also call for a greater use of what can be described 
as mutiplex modeling and methodologies in specific case studies in order to gain an 
understanding of what works, what fails, and why the difference, in the historical record of 
conflict reduction through identity affirmation (Boudreau, forthcoming). 
 
The Elements of Identity Affirmation: A Proposed Model 
There are four elements in the proposed model of conflict reduction through identity 
affirmation: leadership, recognition, validation, and the transparency of future time. 
 
These can be reconceptualized using Jay Rothman’s idea (1997) of the ARIA which, first and 
foremost, keeps the focus on the importance of identity in conflict. It also forces us, as 
Rothman states, to focus and be more precise. Hence, the ARIA form is tried here, with the 
precautionary caveat that, just as composers write different arias—using the same form as a 
tool to give structure and sound to their different musical inspirations, so too it will be 
necessary to compose a different aria than Rothman’s here. 
 Given this, the model can be described as an Affirmation ARIA, consisting of the 
following formula: (A) Affirmation in inter-group conflict requires (R) Recognition and 
reciprocity; (I) Initiatives by in-group leadership or citizens, or both; and (A) Acceptance of 
the hitherto out-group which consists of (1) validation of the out-group’s past pain and 
traumas, when appropriate and (2) concrete efforts to insure the transparency of future time 
between groups. 
We will define and discuss each of these terms in the logical sequence in which they 
should occur. In essence, this model attempts to do on a group or international level what 
Martin Buber (1974) describes as an essential, if not the essential, transformation of 
relationships on the individual level—changing an “I-it” relationship into an “I-Thou” 
relationship. This requires challenging the in-group history of hostility towards an out-group 
through its own processes of selective self-definition. This is admittedly a daunting task, even 
in the best of times, but as we shall see, there are historical examples in which people have 
reached out over the great divide of inter-group conflict and sought conflict reduction, even 
resolution, through identity affirmation. 
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The Model 
AFFIRMATION of an out-group identity is the summation or result of the following three 
interrelated though separate elements: Recognition, Initiatives by in-group leaders and Acceptance. 
1.Recognition 
 A critical factor of identity affirmation is recognition. This is, in essence, an initiative by 
in-group leadership that has legal implications and consequences. Recognition by an in-group of an 
out-group has, at least, three elements which are: (1) affirming the right of a group to existence, (2) 
reciprocity, and (3) equality. Recognition by an in-group of a former out-group means, at its 
extreme, that the we-group recognizes the right of the “others” simply to exist. For instance, for 
many years, the state of Israel’s right to exist was not recognized by any of its Arab neighbors. 
Then in 1977, President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem thereby recognizing, in 
one bold step, the existence of Israel. It took almost a year and half for the governments of Egypt 
and Israel, after much negotiations and a Camp David Summit involving Presidents Carter, Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin to ratify this bold initiative in the form of the Camp David Peace 
Accords; yet, as Janice Gross Stein notes (2001), the irreversible first step was taken when 
President Sadat first stepped off the plane onto Israeli soil. In that first symbolic as well as 
substantive step, he broke with his Arab allies and recognized the state of Israel’s right to coexist 
in peace with its largest neighbor. In doing so, he initiated a peace process that continued through 
the 1990s. In a paradox of peace and affirmation, President Sadat simply recognized what the 
Israeli people already possessed— namely, their right to exist, and to coexist with their neighbors 
without the constant threat of war. 
In short, recognition of the “other” in its most basic form affirms the inherent right of the 
“other” to exist as part of the human family. As such, it is the basic foundation to identity 
affirmation. Cast in these terms, recognition fundamentally means that the “we-group” no longer 
seeks to destroy or annihilate the “out-group.”   Recognition also implies, and requires, acceptance 
of the moral obligation by the in-group that reciprocity, and not oppression, will govern the 
relationship between the groups in the future. Reciprocity, in turn, means that the in-group will 
demand no rights for itself that it denies to the out-group. Furthermore, it requires that the in-group 
will make no demands upon the out-group that it refuses to accept for itself. In essence, reciprocity 
affirms that the in-group recognizes its moral and legal obligations to treat the out-groups as 
equals. This requires, first and foremost, changing the in-group’s internal discourses, narratives, 
tropes and stereotypes of the out-group. One way to do this is to change the narratives and stories 
told about the enemy other” within the group; by doing so, the “we-group” accepts the 
responsibility not to demonize, satirize or scapegoat the out group (Senehi 2002). The “we-group” 
also accepts the obligation not to deny members of the out-group the same access to a cultural 
identity, resources, education and employment that it demands for itself. To do otherwise is 
discrimination based upon group membership, and thus is the very antithesis of conflict reduction 
between groups through identity affirmation. 
Recognition is also a legal term under international law and acknowledges that a de jure 
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equality exists between two nation-states (Slomanson, 2003). This recognizes the importance 
of equality in relations between states or, for that matter, ethnic, religious and racial groups. 
The concept of equality is inherent in the recognition and identity affirmation of an out-group 
by an in-group as well. In essence, it acknowledges the sovereignty of one group, and its rights 
to self-determination, free from external or internal influences instigated by the other group. 
Equality means, at its most primitive level, that one group or individual does not have the right 
to prey upon the labor, life or happiness of another group or individual. 
Dr. Martin Luther King recognized this reality in his famous “Letter From the 
Birmingham Jail,” written under the most difficult circumstances in the spring of 1963. At the 
time, Dr. King was leading a nonviolent civil rights effort to desegregate eating facilities in 
Birmingham, Alabama. In his letter, which he wrote on scraps of paper that were then passed 
to associates outside the prison, Dr. King wrestles with the difficult question: What constitutes 
a just law? His answer is based upon both moral and legal grounds; he states that: 
To use the words of Martin Buber, the great Jewish philosopher, segregation substitutes 
an ‘I-it’ relationship for the ‘I-thou’ relationship, and ends up relegating persons to the 
status of things. So segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically 
unsound, but it is morally wrong and sinful…Let us turn to a more concrete example 
of a just and unjust law. An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a 
minority that is not binding on itself. This is difference made legal. On the other 
hand a just law is a code that the majority compels a minority to follow that it is 
willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal….Let me give another 
explanation. An unjust law is a code inflicted upon the minority which the minority had 
no part in enacting or creating because they did not have the unhampered right to vote. 
Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up the segregation laws was 
democratically elected?…there are some counties[in Alabama] without a single negro 
registered to vote despite the fact that the negro constitutes the majority of the 
population. Can any law set up in such a state be considered democratically structured? 
[Emphasis added] 
In essence, Dr. King (1963) was arguing for the recognition by American society of 
Blacks’ right to be treated equally under the law as American citizens. By first making a 
natural law argument, Dr. King first goes beyond the American context and argues that such 
equal treatment is a basic right entitled to all humans. He then makes a very compelling 
constitutional argument as well. As Dr. King knew well, the first step in securing equal 
treatment, and in gaining the equal protection of the law—whether domestically or 
internationally—is recognition of the other as a human being. As such, this is a critical 
preliminary element in identity affirmation. 
2. Initiatives By In group Leadership: Track I and Track II Diplomacy 
  As Janice Gross Stein notes (2001), dynamic leadership is required to initiate the 
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process of conflict reduction with an out-group. When we think of public leadership, we 
often think of our political leaders and diplomats. Public leaders in their official capacity are 
obviously prime candidates for initiating the process of conflict reduction through identity 
affirmation. This is often referred to as Track I, which usually consists of official diplomacy 
by governmental officials. A political leader often have the visibility and salience to 
participate in, and sometimes even challenge, the internal narratives, tropes and discourses 
that selectively define his or her own "in-group;” he or she is often in a position to influence, 
sometimes profoundly, the internal discourse and narratives concerning the in-group’s 
collective mythos. 
Yet, this is not to imply, as mentioned earlier, that a specific group’s elites are 
somehow in total agreement about which discourse, history or trope to privilege; elites may 
be in bitter competition and conflict concerning which historical and psycho-cultural factors 
should be ascendant and privileged within a group. For instance, in many Middle Eastern 
states today, there is a fierce internal debate between those elites that favor a secular state, 
and those that an Islamic nation and government. This debate mirrors the larger conflict that 
often exists between traditional societies and modern nation-states (Smith 1995, 1991).  
  There are many complex reasons for this current historical phenomena; yet, to 
explore the dynamics of this debate goes far beyond the current scope of this paper. The 
point is that political leaders can often participate in the simultaneous process of trying to 
change or renegotiate their own group’s collective mythos and, secondly, also attempting to 
participate in the reinterpretation and new narrative of the in group’s image of an ethnic or 
even “enemy” group. This is another way that a leader can attempt to participate in 
redefining a group’s prevailing and privileged self-image, and selective interpretations of 
itself and others.  
 The in-group of the leader initiating the process of identity affirmation may 
have deeply embedded stereotypes and prejudices concerning injuries or injustices of its 
own, real or imagined, suffered at the hands of the out group, or “ enemy-other.”  So, by 
initiating recognition and identity affirmation of another group, the leader may be arousing 
deadly ghosts and powerful forces contained within his or her own community’s collective 
mythos. Hence, an astute leader will prepare his or her in-group for the transformation of 
the in-group’s collective mythos; simultaneously as he or she seeks to transform the 
stereotypes, prejudices and even hatreds aimed at the leader’s own people contained in the 
collective mythos of the out-group. 
Changing group perceptions and deeply held self-images can be extremely 
problematic even in the absence of a well defined or perceived threat from an ethnic or 
“enemy” other  (Jervis, 1976). This, at least partially explains why often the most difficult 
task of political leadership is to challenge the collective mythos, narratives and tropes of 
one’s own in-group concerning an  enemy or apparently “hostile” out-group.  This is 
one reason why leadership in beginning a process of identity affirmation of another group 
requires real courage.  The resistance of the one’s own group to any change or challenge to 
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its prevailing and powerful collective mythos makes the task of identity affirmation concerning 
an enemy, or openly hostile group, the most difficult and dangerous step in the process. One 
has only to remember that Gandhi was assassinated by a fellow Hindu soon after he announced 
plans to make a peace mission to Pakistan—thus implicitly, at least, affirming the identity of 
the Moslem state. Nor, unfortunately, was he alone in this regard. 
 In the fall of 1977, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt made the short yet historic trip 
from Cairo to Jerusalem, and thus became the first leader in the Arabic world to recognize the 
state of Israel. In essence, he stated that "We have all suffered enough; It is time to give peace 
a chance."  He then whispered to the press, stating "I have a secret ally in Israel--the Israeli 
mother."  
(Sadat, 2003)  His initiative began the public peace process between Israel and its neighbors. 
Yet, his initiative was not so popular at home; extremists were not prepared for the 
transformation of Egypt’s collective mythos towards Israel that Sadat’s initiative of 
recognition and peaceful relations entailed. He was assassinated by his own countrymen in the 
fall of 1981. 
More recently, in 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel was assassinated by a 
fellow Jew after he publicly recognized the rights of the Palestinians to a homeland or “entity” 
within the West Bank. His death was a tragic loss and the Middle East peace process now 
seems moribund as a result.  
 So, challenging the prevailing stereotypes and the enemy image of the “other” within 
the in-group requires firmness and resolve. The key is for someone within the in-group or we-
group to initiate a deliberate policy and process of conflict reduction through identity 
affirmation. Accepting the challenge to begin such a process is a critical indicator of true social 
and political leadership, especially if by doing so, the possibility of armed conflict and war can 
be lessened or eliminated. However, as the tragic examples of Gandhi, Sadat and Rabin 
indicate, the process of initiating identity affirmation can be very dangerous as well, until 
one’s own in-group is prepared to accept the previously perceived enemy out-group as an 
equal partner in the pursuit of peace. 
 
Track II or Multitrack Leadership: Non-Political Initiatives 
 Because the risks to political leaders who seek to challenge the collective mythos of 
their own group is often great, the initiative to affirm the identity of an out-group can fall to 
leaders and participants of non-political organizations. Ambassador John McDonald, Joseph 
Montville and others have defined and developed the concept of Track II, or citizen, 
diplomacy (Volkan, Julius and Montville 1991, Diamond and McDonald 1996; Saunders, 
1999)    
 Track II diplomacy consists of religious, economic or other nonpolitical leaders, or 
simply private citizens, who engage in citizen diplomacy and constructive engagement with 
citizens of the out-group or even with the “enemy.” By doing so, such citizen diplomats 
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implicitly or explicitly affirm the identity of the excluded group while simultaneously 
beginning the long process of transforming the image of the “other” within the in-group. This 
may make it safer eventually for political leaders to take such initiatives to affirm the out-
group as well. 
 Examples of successful Track II diplomacy are numerous—and growing   For 
instance, during the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy sometimes asked Norman Cousins, 
editor of the Saturday Review to undertake “unofficial” missions to Moscow to discuss policy 
and political possibilities with the Soviet leadership. These efforts helped lead to the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty in 1963. More recently, in the 1980s, numerous non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) made repeated trips to the Soviet Union to meet with citizen groups, as 
well as the official leadership, in an effort to overcome the enemy image of the Soviet people 
held by many Americans. In the late 1970s, Professor Richard “Red” Schwartz (1989) of 
Syracuse University started the first American Jewish-Palestinian group dedicated to dialogue 
and mutual understanding. Today, there dozens of such groups, and Professor Schwartz is 
tireless in his efforts to bring about an “affirmation” of each group by the other through 
private, citizen-to-citizen channels. 
As Track II diplomacy illustrates, leadership in affirming the identity of an out-group 
need not come simply from de jure political or diplomatic leaders. The crucial contribution of 
leadership, whether it be by private citizens or by highly visible and powerful public leaders is 
to begin a process of conflict reduction through identity affirmation.  
 The ideal outcome is that the initiative of the leader to affirm the “other” will be 
accepted by his or her society as a whole, and be eventually embedded in the very social fabric 
of the in-group.  We will come back to this problem -- the problem of embedding a new 
relationship between groups, creating in essence a new collective mythos or, at least, 
transforming critical parts of the old one—in the section on “the transparency of future time.” 
 
3. Acceptance 
Acceptance as a moral and political force has two interrelated components: (a) Validation and 
(b) promoting the” Transparency of Future Time” between groups. 
Validation of Pain: Taking Responsibility 
Understanding the collective mythos of another group is most important when trying to 
reduce conflict through identity affirmation. This is because a critical aspect of Identity 
Affirmation  is recognition and validation of the out-group’s past experiences of traumas, pain 
and defeats, especially if inflicted by the in-group that now seeks to affirm its former 
opponents. As stated earlier, fear of the “others,” and recollections of past pain and defeats at 
the hands of another, are often a vitally important part of a group's identity, included within its 
collective mythos (Volkan 1998). Jay Rothman is right when he states that fear of another out-
group—based upon that group’s past persecution, hatred and hostility of the in-group—is a 
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contributing factor to continuing inter-group conflict (Rothman 1997). 
 In particular, the leadership of the group making the affirmation should, when 
appropriate, openly acknowledge and mourn for the affirmed group’s past traumas and 
prolonged past traumatic experiences, which Volkan calls the “traumatized self-
representation” of the group (Volkan 1998). This is what West German Chancellor Billy 
Brandt apparently tried to do during his official visit to Poland in 1971. During that visit, he 
spontaneously knelt in front of the monument built to the memory of the millions of Poles who 
fell victim to the Nazi’s policies of extermination. Admittedly, this was probably not enough, 
in itself, to challenge the Poles’—or the rest of the watching world—internal group narratives 
concerning the aggressive policies and practices of Germany or of Germans in the past; but it 
was a demonstrable beginning, and it announced, with a simple yet solemn gesture, a radical 
departure from the not too distant past, acknowledging the tremendous suffering of the Polish 
nation who lost over six million people during the war.  
Validation is the process of acknowledging the past trauma, pain, suffering of the out-
group. In essence, validation is taking responsibility and apologizing for, when applicable, the 
past pain, trauma, discrimination and stereotypical distortions by the in-group. This is 
substantiation—first by the leaders and then by the members of the in-group as a whole-- that 
the collective loss suffered by the out-group was a real and often deeply embittering 
experience. By doing so, the leadership of the in-group is taking responsibility, when 
appropriate, for its share for the problems in the past relationship between the groups, 
especially for any pain that may have resulted from the in-group’s actions. 
  As such, validation is the “emotional project” of identity affirmation. Validation 
seeks to acknowledge the group’s past traumas—and the concomitant emotional losses that 
such past pain cost the group in terms of realizing its full potential. In particular, it seeks to 
reduce the fear of the hitherto persecuted group by taking deliberate and often unprecedented 
steps to reassure and add respect and reciprocity to a new relationship between groups. By 
doing so, it may help to reduce the “traumatized self-representation” of the once excluded 
group (Volkan, 1998). 
The converse of validation, especially the act of taking responsibility for past pain 
inflicted by the in-group upon the out-group, is to act as though the collective loss of the group 
did not occur, and was not real. For instance, certain groups, especially in Germany, deny that 
the Holocaust during World War II occurred. This is a frightening claim that stands at the 
opposite extreme— in essence, the total negation— of identity affirmation and especially the 
recognition of all groups in the human family’s right to exist in peace, in pursuit of their 
“unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” 
Another real danger is that there are times when validation of a group’s past pain can 
be extremely inappropriate. President Reagan’s trip to Bitburg, Germany to place a wreath at 
the gravesite of Nazi war dead was, to many Americans, shocking and inappropriate. For 
instance, in a widely publicized event, Nobel laureate Elie Wiesal, in a face-to- face encounter 
with President Reagan, pleaded for him not to make the trip. Yet, President Reagan went 
anyway, “affirming” what wiser men would simply let lie. At least American veterans of 
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General Patton’s Third Army (who, during World War II, fought at Bitburg) could 
sardonically joke that the real purpose of the trip was to praise the marksmanship of the U.S. 
Army infantry. 
 But this is a sad commentary on the negative effects and narratives that emerge within 
the in-group when an affirmation and validation of an out-group’s past pain is inappropriate. 
As such, President Reagan’s trip to Bitburg illustrates how delicate, and even dangerous, 
inappropriate validation can be to inter-group relations. So validation of past pain must be used 
as carefully as a surgeon’s scalpel –less old wounds be reopened, and conflict potentially 
intensified rather than reduced. 
 In contrast, President John F. Kennedy openly and publicly acknowledged the suffering 
and losses of the Soviet peoples in his June, 1963 American University speech, stating: 
“And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the 
course of the Second World War. At least twenty million lost their lives. Countless millions of 
homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation’s territory, including two-thirds 
of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devastation of this 
country east of Chicago” (Kennedy 1963). 
 The historical context of Kennedy’s speech should be noted. With the end of World 
War II and the outbreak of the Cold War, the reality of the Soviet Union losses during World 
War II was largely lost in the West.  Hence the political, not to mention the emotional, impact 
of Kennedy’s speech in recognizing and validating the still fresh wounds of the Soviet people 
were great. For instance, President Kennedy’s science advisor, Jerome Wiesner stated that 
intelligence reports indicated that Chairman Khushchev said it was the best speech ever made 
by an American president. 
In essence, appropriate validation is taking responsibility, when applicable, for the past 
pain, trauma, discrimination and stereotypical distortions or omissions by the in-group of the 
out-group. Furthermore, it is recognizing that the most powerful way to do this is through an 
emotional and often symbolic response, or series of responses, that goes to the core of the 
excluded group’s collective mythos.  
As President Kennedy’s speech illustrates, the simple yet substantive gesture will 
sometimes do. For instance, if a future foreign leader wants to make peace with, or improve 
relations concerning, the United States, he or she could first go to place flowers at the eternal 
peace flame burning on the battlefield of Gettysburg, now a national park and historic site. 
Such a simple gesture might well arouse the deepest hopes and emotions, in both the north and 
south of the United States, “to achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, as President 
Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural speech, “among ourselves and with all 
nations.” [Emphasis added] 
Transparency of Future Time: Forging A New 
 The border between the United States and Canada is an example of making future time 
as transparent as possible. That is because neither country has any military forces located near 
the border with the express mission to defend the border from the other. Both governments 
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have expressed support of this policy of, in essence, defenseless frontiers. As a result, it is the 
longest undefended border in the world. By not stationing troops in a position that could harm 
the other, both governments are, to the best of their abilities, demonstrating that there is no 
intent, nor capability to invade and harm the other. The verifiable lack of capability is one way 
to make transparent the relationship of the two governments, at least in regards to this issue in 
the future. The U.S. and Canada may have deep differences over economic policies, Cuba and 
pollution, especially in the Great Lakes area, but these differences have not influenced their 
common commitment to reassure the other that, “in the future, we have no plans or immediate 
capabilities to hurt i.e. invade you.”  The lack of a current capability to inflict harm in the 
foreseeable future is a key step in making transparent future time.  
Transparency of future time means that the in-group will attempt to build a new and 
safer relationship with the hitherto excluded group by taking concrete steps and  immediate 
behavioral actions—as distinct from mere verbal promises-- to make their future relationship 
as predictable and transparent as possible. In his book, Evolution of Cooperation, Robert 
Axlerod (1984) discusses extending “the shadow of the future” over current interpersonal 
interactions as one way to insure continuous cooperation. The idea is that the prospect and 
promise of having a continuous and mutually beneficial relationship in the future is one way to 
engender or enhance cooperation in the present. Extending the “shadow of the future” over 
current interactions and transactions is the first key characteristic of the transparency of future 
time. 
 The second is verifiability. With the promise of a new and ongoing relationship, the in-
group and hitherto out-group should have verifiable means and mechanisms to insure that the 
other side does not have the capability to hurt the other. Thus, for instance, in the Cold War, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact eventually had vast 
early warning and satellite systems to verify in “real time” the changing military capabilities of 
the other.  
 This task may become more difficult as the group size becomes relatively smaller. For 
smaller nations or groups entangled in a regional or even local conflict, such elaborate systems 
are usually not possible, and may not be necessary. Other means may be used, depending on 
the scale of the conflict, to enhance confidence in the future. One such mechanism is the 
exchange of observers, which is our third factor in the transparency of future time. 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), used by the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War in Europe sought to make the future more transparent but through 
complex mechanisms involving the exchange of information, including the exchange of 
military observers (mentioned above). In the Cold War CBMs, military observers were often 
exchanged whenever either side planned military exercises that required the local, and even 
theater wide, build-up of forces. The exchange of military observers was most often 
temporary, with the important exceptions of military attaches to either NATO or Warsaw Pact 
countries and a small group of permanent military observers arranged between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union.  
Another variation of the exchange is to have international observers positioned within 
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both groups to insure transparency and to verify the lack of capability to inflict harm upon 
the other. Some authors, including this one, have advocated the use of such international 
observers even in actual wartime as a way to minimize damage and casualties, as well as 
build the credibility of the third party that might be useful in the eventual settlement of the 
conflict. This practice was actually used during the Iran-Iraq War by then Secretary-General 
Perez de Cuellar with remarkable results in that he, with the very able assistance of Assistant 
Secretary-General Giandomenico Picco (1999), eventually earned enough trust from both 
sides to be acceptable mediators who helped to end that tragic war (Boudreau 1991). 
Educational exchanges are another way of making transparent future time since they 
can potentially cast the shadow of future cooperation over the relationship of educational 
institutions  and groups that can ripple out into society. The founder of the first modern 
exchange program in the United States was the eccentric yet affable genius Donald Watt of 
Putney, Vermont. Watt (1967) believed in the simple yet unheard of idea (in the 1920s) of 
learning about other countries by living in them with a native family. His simple idea gave 
birth to the Experiment in International Living in Brattleboro, Vermont in the 1930s. Now, at 
latest count, there are over 600 educational exchange programs in the United States, 
consisting of individual home stays for an individual student in another land to complete 
college semester abroad programs. Hence, it seems that Watt (1967) had a good, yet 
elegantly simple, idea—namely, that people learn best about other cultures by living in them 
and bringing back an enriched understanding of other groups and nations. 
 A final and very powerful way of making the future transparent is to promote 
economic cooperation between the former antagonistic groups or nation-states. This is the 
great hope and idea behind the present formation of the European Union (EU). Inspired by 
Jean Monnet, the first actual steps, implemented in the 1950s, involved the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community formed by the 1951 Treaty of Paris which integrated 
the steel industries of Germany and France, thus making it theoretically and practically 
impossible for each nation to go to war with the other (Slomanson 2003).   
So, to summarize, transparency of future time means that the in-group will attempt to 
build a new and safer relationship with the hitherto excluded group by taking concrete steps 
to make their joint future relationship as predictable and transparent as possible. For a lasting 
peace, or even for a reduction of a conflict to occur, any affirmation of a group identity 
should include, not only the recognition and validation of each others’ past or present 
triumphs and tragedies, when appropriate, but also include the promise and realistic 
expectation of a normalized-- i.e. non harmful—relationship in the future.  
 The promise to embed the new relationship within economic structures that can 
bring prosperity to all is a very powerful way of changing competing discourses and 
narratives within all the involved groups—especially if they see that cooperation with a 
former enemy will be secure and profitable in the future. This is what the European 
Community and now European Union and, in particular, France and Germany have tried to 
do over the past decades. This is what the transparency of future time seeks to do –to build a 
future together that is as predictable, safe and productive as possible. In this way, the identity 
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of all groups, of all nations, is not only affirmed—it is assured and secured in the prospects of 
a more peaceful posterity. 
        Problems and Prospects 
 There are, of course, numerous problems with the idea of inter-group conflict reduction 
through identity affirmation; I will mention only a few possible ones here. First, as Meridith 
Gould (1999) states in a critique of this paper: "“reducing conflicts among groups that have 
different traditions, norms, values, languages and customs is a very difficult task. The first 
step…is to get the groups to recognize and believe that a ‘relationship’ is needed and desired.” 
   If such a relationship is desired, Gould (1999) points out that that there is an important 
distinction between whether these groups had a relationship in the past or whether they are 
developing a new one. There may be very different results concerning the impact of identity 
affirmation if the relationship between the groups is pre-existent, and previously traumatic, or 
totally new. The model (proposed above) of identity affirmation, as of yet, does not account 
for these potential differences. 
 Secondly, as Ms. Gould points out, the model as currently defined is too generic; it 
does not adequately discriminate between the very different types of groups that exist; nor 
does it adequately define the kinds of relationships that these groups hope to foster (Gould 
1999). Future research is needed to specify what types of groups are most responsive, (or not 
responsive at all) and what types of potentially different relationships result from attempted 
identity affirmation by a group. For instance, would Identity Affirmation be more or less 
effective if a very large group, say a” nation(s)-state,” uses identity affirmation that is directed 
towards a smaller group, or vice versa? Or, does it work best between groups that are relatively 
“equal” in size and power?  
 Furthermore, at what level of group analysis is identity affirmation most effective, if 
at all, in changing the internal stereotypes, privileged discourses and tropes of all the groups 
involved? In short, is there an optimal level of analysis in terms of the size, composition, 
education or political orientation of the group attempting an identity affirmation, as well as a 
group whose identity is being affirmed? Perhaps the latter group might even resent that such 
an attempt of identity affirmation is being made, thus making the inter-group conflict possibly 
worse! 
The problem of empirical testing, refinement and verification of this proposed model 
must also be addressed. In a forthcoming paper, I suggest that the field of conflict analysis and 
resolution must use a multiplex methodology as one approach in order to ascertain and make 
“knowledge claims” concerning human conflicts, and their aftermaths. A multiplex 
methodology has at least two critical characteristics that its shares with actual human conflicts. 
First, these conflicts typically have multiple parties, including allies, and thus require multiple 
levels of analysis, evaluation and intervention (Byrne and Keashly 2000).  A multiplex 
methodology is systematic inquiry into the multiple, simultaneous and often contradictory 
knowledge claims made by all significant parties to a violent human conflict; in fact, one of the 
great prizes of a protracted social conflict (Azar 1990) is the power to characterize a violent 
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conflict situation. These competing knowledge claims do not lend themselves, at first, to a 
Hegelian or Gandhian synthesis (Bondurant 1971). Thus they have to be simultaneously 
examined as they exist in a conflict situation, which is a second characteristic of the 
multiplex approach. Changing these competing knowledge claims into a shared discourse 
(Senehi 1996, 2000, 2003) is one of the goals of identity affirmation. The methodological 
challenge remains of accurately evaluating such attempts at identity affirmation and thus 
accurately measuring whether change occurs in internal discourses among all significant 
groups in a violent human conflict (Boudreau, forthcoming). 
Finally, does identity affirmation create any value-added (Sebenius 1984) 
possibilities in the relationship, and potential future negotiations, between the involved 
groups? If so, is the value-added immediate, short-lived or long term? In other words, are the 
potential posited changes in the groups’ internal discourses about themselves and each other 
lasting, or do they fade over time? (“Posited” in the sense that the model does anticipate that 
such changes will occur in the dynamic and selective self-definition of each group.)  If the 
impact of such affirmations is short-termed, then will additional acts of affirmation and 
reciprocation, such as the ones recommended by Charles Osgood (1962), will be needed in 
the future in order to make these posited changes a permanent part of a group’s collective 
mythos? 
There are obviously no immediate answers to these questions; only further empirical 
and theoretical work can critically review, reject or elaborate and refine the model proposed 
here of Identity Affirmation. 
It needs to be emphasized that conflict reduction through identity affirmation is no 
panacea for peace; it is doubtful, for instance, that such an initiative will work during a 
period of violent escalation between groups or nations. As Fisher and Keashly point out 
(1991), the timing and coordination of efforts to transform a conflict is crucial. So, in view of 
this, the staging and timing of Identity Affirmation must carefully considered by in-group 
leaders or members before being attempted. Or, as the example of Bitburg illustrates, it may 
be simply inappropriate to do at all. 
  As such, conflict reduction through identity affirmation should be viewed simply as 
one more tool, one more potential approach, in a spectrum of conflict reduction or resolution 
techniques, to be used when decision makers think it appropriate. Secondly, the very real 
risks of failure in an affirmation initiative may enhance stereotypes of each other, and thus 
increase inter-group or international polarization. Thirdly, despite the very best efforts at 
identity affirmation by a group or government may simply fail to incrementally change the 
thinking or soften the hardened hearts of the “enemy.” Intractable antagonisms, conflict or 
even war may be the inevitable outcome of such a protracted impasse. Even so, this article is 
suggesting that, if the timing and staging is right, an attempt could be made by an in-group to 
reduce its conflict with an out-group through identity affirmation, at some point in their 
troubled relationship, before the final gauntlet is flung. 
Conclusion: Weaving a New Beginning 
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 This paper argues that a conflict between groups can be potentially lessened by the 
explicit affirmation by one group of the other group’s identity, including its past pain, defeats 
and losses. If pursued in good faith, such affirmations may help reduce inter-group or 
international conflict. The process of identity affirmation is based upon the premise that the 
psycho-cultural self-images and historical discourses that help define in-group identity are 
open to internal challenge and change prompted, if necessary, by an out-group’s  “affirmative” 
efforts and can thus be transformed, even if marginally, as a precursor to establishing better 
inter-group relations. 
This paper first examined and defined group identity in terms of the group’s own 
dynamic process of selective self-definition. The potential use of identity affirmation to change 
self-selective internal discourses into a shared common discourse between groups has also 
been explored. The process of identity affirmation by one group may help create “value added” 
possibilities, especially for future negotiations between the groups, but more research is 
needed in this area in the future.  
Also, the possibility of using a model of identity affirmation, with appropriate 
modification from the one presented here, on the interpersonal level to reduce fear and 
conflict should be considered and explored in the future, especially by specialists in the field, 
like social psychologists, and mental health professionals. Finally, this study proposes a model 
through identity affirmation that may work to reduce fear and conflict between very large 
groups, including nation–states. Yet, more research needs to be completed, and actual case 
studies contemplated in order to develop, refine and test the model. 
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